During the initial wave of the banking crisis in March, I published “Truist: Immense Unrealized Bond Losses Threaten Core Equity Stability.” At the time, Trust Financial Corp. (NYSE:TFC) had suffered the most significant drawdown among the top-ten US banks. Roughly five months ago, I was among the few analysts with a definitively bearish outlook on the bank, while many had viewed it as a dip-buying opportunity. My perspective was that although TFC’s “bank run” risk was low, the vast extent of its off-balance sheet losses left it with little safety for a potential rise in loan losses. Further, I expected that growing net interest margin pressures would substantially lower the bank’s income over the coming year, potentially compounding its risks.
Since then, TFC has declined by an additional ~11% in value and recently retraced back near its May bottom, associated with the failure of the Federal Republic. I believe the most recent wave of downside in at-risk banks is a notable signal that the market continues to underestimate systemic US financial system risks. Of course, following TFC’s most recent bearish pattern, I expect many investors to increase their position, viewing the company as significantly discounted. Accordingly, I believe it is an excellent time to take a closer look at the firm to estimate better its discount potential or the probability of Truist facing much more significant strains.
Estimating Truist’s Price-to-NAV
On the surface, TFC appears to have considerable discount potential. The stock’s TTM “P/E” is 6.3X compared to a sector median of 8.7X. Its forward “P/E” of 7.7X is also below the banking sector’s median of 9.3X. TFC’s dividend yield is currently at 7.2%, nearly twice as much as the sector median of 3.7%. Finally, its price-to-book is 0.66X, considerably lower than the sector median of 1.05X. Based on these more surface-level valuation metrics, TFC appears to be around trading around a 25% to 35% discount to the banking sector as a whole. Of course, we must consider whether or not this apparent discount is pricing for the bank’s elevated risk compared to others.
Importantly, Truist is one of the most impacted banks by the increase in long-term securities interest rates, giving the bank huge unrealized securities losses. Based on its most recent balance sheet (pg. 12), we can see that Truist has about $56B in held-to-maturity “HTM” agency mortgage-backed-securities “MBS” at amortized cost, worth ~$46B at fair value, giving Truist a $10B loss that is not accounted for in its book value. That figure has remained virtually unchanged since its Q4 2022 earnings report through Q2 2023; however, it will rise with mortgage rates since higher rates lower the fair value of MBS assets. Truist’s Q2 report also notes that all of its HTM MBS securities are at due over ten years, meaning they’re likely ~20-30 year mortgage assets that carry the most significant duration risk (or negative valuation impact from higher mortgage rates).
Significantly, the long-term Treasury and mortgage rates have risen in recent weeks as the yield curve begins to steepen without the short-term rate outlook declining. See below:
From the late 2021 lows through the end of June, the long-term mortgage rate rose by around 4%, lowering Truist’s MBS HTM assets fair value by ~$10B, while its available-for-sale securities lost ~$11.9B in value (predominantly due to MBS assets as well). Accordingly, we can estimate that the duration of its securities portfolio (almost entirely agency MBS) is roughly $5.5B in estimated losses per 1% increase in mortgage rates. Since the end of June, mortgage rates have risen by approximately 35 bps, giving TFC an estimated Q3 securities loss of ~$1.9B. Around $1B should show up on TFC’s balance sheet and income, while ~$900M will remain unrealized based on its current AFS vs. HTM portioning.
For me, we must value TFC accounting for both. Total unrealized losses and estimated losses based on the most recent changes in long-term interest rates. That said, should mortgage rates reverse lower, Truist should not have that $1.9B estimated securities loss in Q3; however, should mortgage rates continue to rise, the bank should post an even more considerable securities loss. At the end of Q2, Truist had a tangible book value of $22.9B. After accounting for unrealized losses, that figure would be around $12.9B. After considering the losses associated with the recent mortgage rate spike, its “liquidation value” is likely closer to $11B. Of course, Truist has a massive ~$34B total intangibles position due to goodwill created in its acquisition spree over the past decade. Although relevant, I believe investors should be careful in accounting for goodwill due to the general decline of the financial sector in recent years.
While much focus has been placed on unrealized securities losses, the risk associated with those losses is vague. Truist can borrow money from the Federal Reserve at par against those assets, partially lowering the associated liquidity risk. However, the Fed’s financing program is at a much higher discount rate (compared to deposit rates) and only lasts one year, so it is not a permanent solution. Further, the unrealized securities losses are on held-to-maturity assets, meaning it will recoup the losses should the assets be held to maturity. Of course, that means it may take 20-30 years, and Truist may need that money before then.
Further, Truist has a substantial residential mortgage portfolio at a $56B cost value at the end of Q2 (data on pg. 48). Those loans had an annualized yield of 3.58% in 2022 and 3.77% in 2023; since the yield did not rise proportionally to mortgage rates, we know the vast majority of those loans are likely fixed-rate long-term. Since they’re not securities positions, Truist need not publish their changes in fair value; however, should Truist look to sell its residential mortgages, they would almost certainly sell at a similar total discount to its MBS assets, considering its yield level is akin to that of long-term fixed-rate mortgages before 2022. I believe the unrealized loss on those loans is likely around $10B.
The rest of Truist’s loan portfolio, worth $326B at cost, is predominantly commercial and industrial ($166B), “other” consumer ($28B), indirect auto ($26.5B), and CRE loans ($22.7B). Excluding residential mortgages, all of its loan portfolio segments have yields ranging from 6-8% (excluding credit cards at 11.5%), with those segments’ total yields rising by around 3-4% from June 2022 to 2023. Accordingly, it is virtually certain that most of its non-mortgage loans are either short-term or fixed-rate since their yields rose with Treasuries, meaning they do not likely face unrealized losses based on the increase in rates.
Overall, I believe that if Truist were to liquidate its assets, its net equity value for common stockholders would be roughly zero, technically $1B. That figure is based on its current tangible book value, subtracting known unrealized losses on securities (~$10B), estimated recent Q3 realized and unrealized losses (~$1.9B), and estimated unrealized mortgage residential loan losses (~$10B). While the bank does have some MSR assets, worth ~$3B, that are positively correlated to rates, I do not believe that segment will offset unrealized losses in any significant manner. Together, those figures equal its tangible book value and would lower the total book value to about $34B. However, in my view, intangibles are not appropriate to account for today because virtually all banks have lost value since its 2019 merger, making its goodwill an essentially meaningless figure.
From a NAV standpoint, TFC is not trading at a discount and is most likely trading at a significant premium. Further, based on these data, Truist is, in my view, seriously undercapitalized. Although TFC posts a CET1 ratio of 9.6%, which is also relatively low, its common tangible equity would be essentially zero if its loans and securities were all accounted for at fair value. To me, that is important because most of its losses are on ultra-long-term assets so it may need that lost solvency sometime before those assets’ maturity. Further, even its 9.6% CET1 ratio is close to its new regulatory minimum of 7.4%, so a slight increase in loan losses or a realization of its estimated ~$22B in unrealized losses would quickly push it below the regulatory minimum.
Truist Earnings Outlook Poor As Costs Rise
To me, Truist is not a value opportunity because it is not discounted to its tangible NAV value. Even its market capitalization is around 65% above its tangible book value, which does not account for its substantial unrealized losses. However, many investors are likely not particularly concerned with its solvency, as that could not be a significant issue if there are no increases in loan losses, declines in deposits, or sharp NIM compression. If Truist can maintain solid operating cash flows, that could compensate for its poor solvency profile.
Of course, TFC cannot continue to try to expand its EPS by increasing its leverage since it is objectively overleveraged, nearly failing its recent stress test. On that note, poor stress test results are essential, but “passing” is somewhat inconsequential, considering most of the recently failed banks would have passed with flying colors, as the test does not account for the substantial negative impacts of unrealized losses on fixed-income assets. That is likely because, when “stress testing” was designed, it was uncommon for long-term rates to spike with inflation as it had, and banks had much lower securities positions compared to loans. Thus, it is quite notable that TFC nearly failed a test that does not account for its substantial unrealized losses.
Looking forward, I believe it is very likely that Truist will face a notable decline in its net interest income over the coming year or more. Fundamentally, this is due to the decrease in Truist’s deposits, total bank deposits, and the money supply. As the Federal Reserve allows its assets to mature, money is effectively removed from the economy; thus, total commercial bank deposits are trending lower. Truist’s deposits are trending lower in line with total commercial banks. I expect Truist’s deposits to continue to slide as long as the Federal Reserve does not return to QE. As Truist competes for a smaller pool of deposits, its deposit costs should rise faster than its loan yields. Today, we’re starting to see the spread between prime loans and the 3-month CD contract, indicating that bank NIMs are declining. See below:
Truist’s core net interest margin has slid from 3.17% in Q4 2022 to 3.1% in Q1 2023 to 2.85% in Q2. Truist’s deposits (10-Q pg. 48) have generally fallen faster than its larger peers, so it needs to increase deposit costs more quickly. Over the past year, its total interest-bearing deposit rate rose from 14 bps to 2.19%, with the most significant rise in CDs to 3.73%.
Notably, Truist has increased its CD rate to the 4.5% to 5% range to try to attract depositors. However, the bank continues not to pay any yield on the bulk of its savings account products, causing a sharp increase in customers switching toward the many banks which pay closer to 5% today. Over the past year, the bank saw around $10B in outflows for interest-bearing deposits and about $25B from non-interest-bearing deposits, making up for those losses with new long-term debt and CDs. Problematically, that means Truist is rapidly losing more-secure liabilities to more fickle ones like CDs and the money market. While this effort may slow the inevitable decline of its NIMs, it will also increase Truist’s solvency risk because it’s becoming more dependent on less secure liquidity sources as people move money between CDs more frequently than opening and closing savings accounts at different banks.
Truist also faces increased expected loan losses due to a rise in late payments last quarter. That trend is correlated to the increase in consumer defaults and the sharp decline in manufacturing economic strength. See below:
Consumer defaults remain normal, but I believe they will rise as consumer savings levels continue to fall and should accelerate lower with student loan repayments. The low PMI figure shows many companies face negative business activity trends, increasing future loan loss risks on Truist’s vast commercial and industrial loan book. Of course, Truist also has a notable CRE loan portfolio, which faces critical risks associated with that sector’s colossal decline this year.
The Bottom Line
Overall, I believe Truist has become even more undercapitalized since I covered it last. I also think Truist faces an increased risk of recession-related loan losses and has a more sharp NIM outlook. Even more significant increases in mortgage rates recently exacerbated strains on its capitalization, while its low savings rates should cause continued deposit outflows. Further, its increased CD rates should create growing negative net interest income pressure.
If there was no recessionary potential, as indicated by the manufacturing PMI, then TFC may manage to get through this period without severe strains; however, its EPS should still decline significantly due to rising deposit costs. That said, if Truist’s loan losses continue to grow due to increasing consumer and business headwinds, its low tangible capitalization leaves it at high risk of significant downsides. If its loan losses grow or its deposits decline, it will need to realize more losses on its assets, quickly pushing its CET1 ratio below its new regulatory minimum. Personally, I strongly expect TFC’s CET1 ratio will fall below the 7.5% level over the next year and could fall even lower if a more severe recession occurs.
I am very bearish on TFC and do not believe there is any realistic discount potential in the stock besides that generated by speculators. Since there is a significant retail speculative activity in TFC and some potential for positive government intervention due to its larger size, I would not short TFC. Although TFC downside risk appears significant, many factors could create sufficient temporary upside that it is not worth short–selling. That said, I believe Truist may be the most important financial risk in the US banking system due to its solvency concerns combined with its size and scope. Accordingly, regardless of their position in TFC, investors may want to keep a particularly close eye on the company because it may create more extensive financial market turbulence than seen from First Republic Bank should it continue to face strains.
Source: seekingalpha.com