The interest rate freeze proposal has just been unveiled by the Bush Administration, a plan which could help as many as 1.2 million borrowers stay in their homes.
“There is no perfect solution,” President Bush said Thursday as he announced the agreement reached among a slew of mortgage industry players. “The homeowners deserve our help. The steps I’ve outlined today are a sensible response to a serious challenge.”
Bush was quick to explain that the plan wasn’t a bailout, claiming the proposed interest rate freeze would only benefit responsible homeowners.
“We should not bail out lenders, real estate speculators or those made the reckless decision to buy a home they knew they could never afford,” Bush said after meeting with industry leaders at the White House. “But there are some responsible homeowners who could avoid foreclosure with some assistance.”
He also noted that thousands of borrowers have been sent letters about their options, and that aid would only come to those who asked for it, urging at-risk homeowners to call the new telephone hotline at 1-888-995-HOPE.
The president had originally given out the wrong phone number for the hotline, which was later corrected by White House staff.
Bush also played a bit of the blame game, saying the Democratic-controlled Congress “has not sent me a single bill to help homeowners.”
Hillary Clinton called Bush’s plan “too little, too late”, referring to the fact that it would exclude the 400,000 homeowners whose mortgage rates have or will reset in the final three months of 2007.
Fed Chief Ben Bernanke released a statement saying, “The streamlined process for refinancing and modifying sub-prime adjustable rate mortgages announced today is a welcome step in helping Americans protect their homes and communities from the consequences of unnecessary foreclosures.”
Meanwhile, the S&P said the mortgage freeze plan may lead to more downgrades on mortgage bonds because loan modifications will lead to reduced payments to investors.
Shares of the top U.S. mortgage lender, Countrywide Financial (CFC), rose $1.68, or 16.12%, to $12.10 on the news.
That said, here are the details regarding the “interest rate freeze proposal” unveiled today:
In order to qualify for an interest-rate freeze, you must have received your mortgage sometime between January 1, 2005 and July 31, 2007, and you need to be facing an interest rate reset sometime between January 1, 2008 and July 31, 2010.
If you fall within this range, you may be eligible to have your interest rate frozen for five years, though you won’t qualify if you are able to make payments at the higher adjustable rate, or if you can’t make payments at the original teaser rate.
The plan is focused on first-lien, 2/28 and 3/27 ARMs for borrowers who are no more than 30 days behind on their mortgage payment.
It only applies to owner-occupied properties, so investment property owners need not apply.
According to a source briefed on the plan, borrowers who have 3 percent or more home equity would also not be eligible for the freeze, and borrowers with credit scores below 660 will be first in line.
The plan identifies three classes of at-risk borrowers:
– Strong borrowers facing an interest-rate reset will be helped into FHA fixed-rate mortgages, and won’t be eligible for an interest rate freeze.
– Borrowers with credit scores below 660 that have not increased by 10 percent since the origination of the mortgage in question will be fast-tracked for a loan modification, though borrowers with higher scores may also qualify.
– And finally struggling borrowers who aren’t able to afford even a modified loan will end up facing foreclosure.
It looks like the proposal will only help a small group of homeowners, though others will receive assistance from individual mortgage lenders and through other government agencies like the FHA.
U.S. Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Mel Martinez (R-Fla.) introduced legislation today aimed at tackling abusive lending practices that have contributed to the current mortgage crisis.
The so-called “Secure and Fair Enforcement in Mortgage Licensing Act” would create national licensing standards for mortgage brokers and lenders and ensure that all mortgage professionals are properly trained in legal aspects of lending, ethics, and consumer protection.
It would also create a national database that consumers can use to verify the credentials of brokers and mortgage lenders they choose to work with.
Ideally, the move would “eliminate bad actors from the mortgage business,” according to the release.
“Today, there are no national standards for mortgage brokers and lenders,” Feinstein said. “And there is only a thin patchwork of regulation by the states.”
“This has allowed unsavory lenders and brokers to take advantage of borrowers, and contributed to the sub-prime mortgage crisis.
“This sets up a nationwide system to keep track of those who’ve violated the law, had their license revoked, or failed to fulfill appropriate educational requirements,” said Senator Martinez, a member of the Senate Banking Committee and a former secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
The SAFE Mortgage Licensing Act would require all residential mortgage loan brokers and lenders obtain a state license, provide fingerprints, a summary of work experience, and consent for a background check to authorities.
To obtain licensing an individual must:
• Have no felony convictions; • Have had no similar license revoked; • Demonstrate a record of financial responsibility; • Fulfill education requirements (20 hours of approved courses, to include at least three hours related to federal laws, four hours on ethics and consumer protection in mortgage lending, and two hours on the subprime mortgage marketplace); and • Pass a written exam (the exam must be at least 100 questions; minimum score of 75 percent required to pass).
The legislation also calls for state regulators to develop a satisfactory licensing system within one year of its enactment.
If that fails to occur, the HUD Secretary would be given discretion to develop the national registry and license, generating revenue for its cost by charging fees to applicants.
The move comes amid a rise in loose lending practices that has led to a record number of defaults and foreclosures, especially in states like California and Florida.
The Bush Administration has failed to implement a sweeping plan to tackle the ongoing mortgage crisis, according to governors who are in Washington for the annual National Governors Association Winter Meeting.
The group said in a release that the two mortgage aid plans currently extended to struggling borrowers fall short because they are confusing, exclude a large number of homeowners, and don’t have “any reporting system to monitor participation and efficacy.”
“Homeownership is a cornerstone of the American Dream and serves as a basic foundation for our local, state and national economies,” said New York Governor Spitzer. “The federal government has failed to offer a solution that is broad enough and swift enough to aggressively stop this crisis from escalating.”
They noted that the Fed’s aid plans don’t have straightforward guidelines for the types of loan modifications or workouts that would be offered to homeowners, stymieing efforts that would likely lead to a higher success rate.
“I urge the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ( OCC ) to compel the national banks and servicers to work with state governors and regulators by providing detailed loan information about delinquencies and potential foreclosures so that states and local governments can accurately assess the foreclosure impact on citizens and their communities,” Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano said.
The governors also want the federal government to get involved with the individual efforts set forth by states across the nation to help solve the problem and create a safety net for the future.
“Maryland, like other states, is taking steps to preserve homeownership and protect its families from this national foreclosure crisis,” said Governor Martin O’Malley.
“But Maryland cannot go it alone. We need a strong partnership with our federal government, which includes passage of strong housing legislation, to help us keep our families in their homes and protect our middle class. The federal government has to work with our states to provide the tools necessary to overcome this national crisis.”
We all know that borrowers and mortgage lenders/servicers have a tough enough time connecting, so any added transparency would likely improve matters for everyone involved.
“The crisis in the sub-prime mortgage market has had a devastating impact on homeowners and entire communities across our country,” Illinois Governor Rod R. Blagojevich said. “In Illinois alone, it is possible that up to 70,000 homeowners will face foreclosure this year. A real solution will require lenders, consumers, advocates and public policy makers to all work together.”
Last week, Illinois unveiled the Homeowners’ Assistance Initiative, a program aimed at helping homeowners trapped in subprime adjustable-rate mortages refinance into fixed-rate mortgages by working directly with the lenders.
The New York State Assembly today passed a rather robust legislative package aimed at addressing the “national sub-prime lending crisis.”
The four-bill bundle contains legislation that, if enacted, would offer assistance to homeowners in default or facing foreclosure, establish requirements on all home loans, provide consumer info to all residential mortgage applicants, and most notably, create a one-year foreclosure moratorium for New York residents.
Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver slammed the Feds for bailing out mortgage lender and investment bank Bear Stearns while leaving everyday homeowners at risk of losing their homes.
He insisted that the slew of bills was not a bailout, but rather an assistance program to help homeowners keep the American dream alive.
The first bit of the legislation would provide assistance payments up to an amount equal to three months of mortgage payments and provide legal services and counseling to help select homeowners in default or facing foreclosure.
The second part of the package would establish the duties of mortgage brokers and remedies for violations, ensure that lenders verify borrower income and the ability to repay loans, and prohibit practices such as balloon mortgage payments, negative amortization and prepayment penalties.
The third bill would permit the courts to delay foreclosure up to one year for subprime borrowers who meet specific conditions, allowing at-risk homeowners to work with their respective lenders to avoid losing their homes.
The final piece of the legislative package would create a “Mortgage Applicant’s Bill of Rights,” which requires mortgage lenders and brokers to provide consumers with a pamphlet that must be read and signed by the borrower prior to applying for a mortgage.
Zillow isn’t a mortgage bank, but they still have pretty good taste. So when you ask Zillow for an interest rate quote, they pass your information on to a lender they work with. One of their best-reviewed lenders? Total Mortgage.
Here are the top 5 reasons why Zillow users have recommended Total Mortgage.
1. They’ve been in the business for 20 years
Total Mortgage was founded in 1997 and has since grown from a small 3-person shop to a national lender with branches scattered across the country. Unlike many other midsized lenders, they never fell into the trap of sub-prime lending, and escaped the housing crisis unscathed.
2. Zillow users rate Total Mortgage highly
If Zillow knows one thing, it’s when to listen to its users—and based on the 4.9/5 rating across over 300 reviews, its users overwhelmingly recommend Total Mortgage. Take a look at what reviewers are saying here.
3. Your processor is always in-house
While some other lenders farm out their processors and customer service agents to outside companies, Total Mortgage keeps their processors on-site at their corporate headquarters in Connecticut or at their local branches. That makes it super easy for them to work with your loan officer if your application ever hits a snag.
4. They offer a 30 day purchase guarantee
Mortgages can take a long time to close—and some lenders take longer than others. Total Mortgage, though, has made a commitment to close on time. If your purchase loan isn’t closed in 30 days, your first mortgage payment is on them.*
5. Total Mortgage is an approved direct lender with Government Agencies
Total Mortgage is a direct lender to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as private investors. That allows them to minimize the overlays and added restrictions that keep buyers from qualifying for the loans they’ve earned.
The role of municipal bond insurance continues to decline in the municipal market, with insured bonds comprising only 11% of year-to-date new issuance through July.
Ambac, one of the largest bond insurers, was downgraded further into “junk” territory in July, and of the ten municipal bond insurers, only three maintain a financial strength rating of AA or higher.
Some positive news may lie on the horizon for investors seeking the highest rated municipals bonds, but it is unlikely insurance will return to the pre-crisis role it played in the municipal market.
While the diminished role of insurance is a negative, we believe it is not enough to offset positive aspects driving performance of the municipal bond market.
The role of bond insurance continues to decline in the municipal market, with insured bonds comprising only 11% of year-to-date new issuance through July.
Prior to the start of the financial crisis in 2007, municipal bond insurers backed roughly half of the entire municipal market.
In 2008, municipal bond insurers began to lose their AAA ratings status, as projected losses on complex mortgage-backed securities led to downgrades from both Moody’s and S&P. For bond issuers, insurance from a company with less than a AAA rating offered little value.
The percentage of newly issued insured bonds dropped to 18% in 2008 and to 11% so far in 2009 according to Bloomberg.
More Junk in the Municipal Realm
Negative headlines continued in July as Ambac, one of the four largest bond insurers, was downgraded further into “junk” territory. Ambac’s ratings were reduced to Caa2 by Moody’s and to CC by S&P, and the downgrades have forced the company to postpone plans to separate its municipal insurance business from its structured mortgaged-backed securities business into a new, more viable company. Of the major municipal bond insurers, only three maintain a rating of AA or better. In table 1, “Credit Watch” indicates a possible rating change in the coming weeks or months; “Outlook” indicates the likely longer-term ratings direction over the next six to twelve months; and “Developing” implies that any change (positive, negative, or none) is possible.
Moody’s has taken a particularly harsh path towards the municipal insurers, stating that a municipal-only insurance model is not viable. Although the ratings agency’s reasoning has been less than clear and perhaps politically motivated, Moody’s believes a AAA-rating is unobtainable for any company given the uncertainty inherent in their business models.
Market impact from negative news, such as the Ambac headlines, has become more muted in 2009. Most insured bonds were already trading in relation to their underlying ratings. The insurers actually took great care with their municipal business (unlike their mortgage business in many cases) and focused on higher quality issuers. Roughly 90% of insured bonds carry an underlying rating of A or better, so insurer downgrades below A have caused fewer corresponding bond downgrades. So although Ambac’s downgrade did result in some subsequent bond downgrades, the ratings on the majority of Ambac insured bonds were unaffected. An insured municipal bond is rated at the higher of the insurer’s rating or its underlying rating (the rating based solely on the municipality’s credit profile).
What’s next for Municipal Bond Insurance?
Since there is no economic value from bond insurance unless it results in at least an A rating for the bond, many of the insurers rated below BBB are now in “runoff” mode. In runoff, the insurers do not underwrite new business (as is the case with Ambac) and simply collect money on insurance premiums already written. Over several years, the insurer hopes that premiums will be enough to offset potential losses on all claims and then attempt to reestablish the business or simply return any excess proceeds to equity and/or bondholders.
An insurer is still liable to pay claims (i.e., a default or missed interest payment) even if in runoff, since they maintain some claims paying ability. Given the potential mountain of claims against the existing capital base (particularly from those subject to sub-prime mortgage exposure), it is uncertain whether these insurers will be able to meet future claims. A bond insurer is required to make up any missed interest payments, but principal repayment, in the case of default, is not made until maturity or until bankruptcy is resolved, whichever comes first.
Potential positives
A potential new insurer and possible new federal legislation could be positive developments for investors seeking the highest quality municipal bonds. Municipal and Infrastructure Assurance Corporation (MIAC), backed by investment bank Macquarie Group and private equity firm Citadel, is attempting to enter the market over coming months as a AAA-rated, municipal bond only insurer. Increasing the pool of AAA-rated bonds would bring in more investors to the municipal market.
The House Financial Services Committee has proposed two bills to be voted on this fall that could affect municipal bond ratings:
The Municipal Bond Fairness Act would require the rating agencies to rate municipal bonds more consistently with other bonds, such as corporate bonds. Since investment grade municipal bonds have exhibited a much lower default rate than comparably rated corporate bonds, this requirement could result in one to two-notch upgrades for thousands of municipal bonds. Moody’s was set to implement such a plan last fall but indefinitely postponed the implementation due to the credit crisis and recession.
The Municipal Bond Insurance Enhancement Act would create a federal financial guarantor to reinsure bonds backed by municipal only insurers. However, the proposed dollar amount of $50 billion is relatively small and could have a limited impact.
Even if these events come to fruition, we don’t expect bond insurance to return to its pre-crisis status. The municipal bond market continues to forge ahead regardless.
We think the rally in municipal bonds will continue, even with insurance questions lingering, but at a more gradual pace. The diminished role of municipal bond insurance is one reason why municipal valuations remain cheap by historical norms despite the impressive rally so far this year. Even without insurance, however, high-quality municipal bonds have exhibited very low default rates. The municipal market continues to benefit from a favorable supply-demand balance, attractive valuations, and the prospect of higher tax rates. Taken together these factors should outweigh insurance woes. On a longer-term basis, the expiration of the Bush tax cuts in 2010 alone could more than offset the lack of insurance and be a catalyst to still higher municipal bond valuations.
IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES
The opinions voiced in this material are for general information only and are not intended to provide specific advice or recommendations for any individual. To determine which investment(s) may be appropriate for you, consult your financial advisor prior to investing. All performance reference is historical and is no guarantee of future results. All indices are unmanaged and cannot be invested into directly.
Neither LPL Financial nor any of its affiliates make a market in the investment being discussed nor does LPL Financial or its affiliates or its officers have financial interest in any securities of the issuer whose investment is being recommended neither LPL Financial nor its affiliates have managed or co-managed a public offering of any securities of the issuer in the past 12 months.
Government bonds and Treasury Bills are guaranteed by the US government as to the timely payment of principal and interest and, if held to maturity, offer a fixed rate of return and fi xed principal value. However, the value of funds shares is not guaranteed and will fluctuate.
The market value of corporate bonds will fluctuate, and if the bond is sold prior to maturity, the investor’s yield may differ from the advertised yield. Bonds are subject to market and interest rate risk if sold prior to maturity. Bond values will decline as interest rates rise and are subject to availability and change in price. High Yield/Junk Bonds are not investment grade securities, involve substantial risks and generally should be part of the diversified portfolio of sophisticated investors. GNMA’s are guaranteed by the U.S. government as to the timely principal and interest, however this guarantee does not apply to the yield, nor does it protect against loss of principal if the bonds are sold prior to the payment of all underlying mortgages.
Muni Bonds are subject to market and interest rate risk if sold prior to maturity. Bond values will decline as interest rates rise. Interest income may be subject to the alternative minimum tax. Federally tax-free but other state and state and local taxes may apply.
Investing in mutual funds involve risk, including possible loss of principal. Investments in specialized industry sectors have additional risks, which are outlines in the prospectus.
Stock investing involves risk including loss of principal.
This article will explain the Big Short and the 2008 subprime mortgage collapse in simple terms.
This post is a little longer than usual–maybe give yourself 20 minutes to sift through it. But I promise you’ll leave feeling like you can tranche (that’s a verb, right?!) the whole financial system!
Key Players
First, I want to introduce the players in the financial crisis, as they might not make sense at first blush. One of the worst parts about the financial industry is how they use deliberately obtuse language to explain relatively simple ideas. Their financial acronyms are hard to keep track of. In order to explain the Big Short, these players–and their roles–are key.
Individuals, a.k.a. regular people who take out mortgages to buy houses; for example, you and me!
Mortgage lenders, like a local bank or a mortgage lending specialty shop, who give out mortgages to individuals. Either way, they’re probably local people that the individual home-buyer would meet in person.
Bigbanks, such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, who buy lots of mortgages from lenders. After this transaction, the homeowner would owe money to the big bank instead of the lender.
Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)—deep breath!—who take mortgages from big banks and bundle them all together into a bond (see below). And just like before, this step means that the home-buyer now owes money to the CDO. Why is this done?! I’ll explain, I promise.
Ratings agencies,
whose job is to determine the risk of a CDO—is it filled with safe mortgages,
or risky mortgages?
Investors, who buy part of a CDO and get repaid as the individual homeowners start paying back their mortgage.
Feel lost already? I’m going to be a good jungle guide and get you through this. Stick with me.
Quick definition: Bonds
A bond can be
thought of as a loan. When you buy a bond, you are loaning your money. The issuer of the bond is borrowing your money. In exchange for borrowing your money, the
issuer promises to pay you back, plus interest, in a certain amount of time.
Sometimes, the borrower cannot pay the investor back, and the bond defaults, or fails. Defaults are not
good for the investor.
The CDO—which is a bond—could hold thousands of mortgages in it. It’s a mortgage-backed bond, and therefore a type of mortgage-backed security. If you bought 1% of a CDO, you were loaning money equivalent to 1% of all the mortgage principal, with the hope of collecting 1% of the principal plus interest as the mortgages got repaid.
There’s one more key player, but I’ll wait to introduce it.
First…
The Whys, Explained
Why does an individual take out a mortgage? Because they want a home. Can you blame them?! A healthy housing market involves people buying and selling houses.
How about the lender;
why do they lend? It used to be
so they would slowly make interest money as the mortgage got repaid. But
nowadays, the lender takes a fee (from the homeowner) for creating (or originating) the mortgage, and then
immediately sells to mortgage to…
A big bank. Why do
they buy mortgages from lenders? Starting in the 1970s, Wall St. started
buying up groups of loans, tying them all together into one bond—the CDO—and
selling slices of that collection to investors. When people buy and sell those
slices, the big banks get a cut of the action—a commission.
Why would an investor
want a slice of a mortgage CDO? Because, like any other investment, the big
banks promised that the investor would make their money back plus interest once the homeowners began
repaying their mortgages.
You can almost trace the flow of money and risk from player to player.
At the end of the day, the investor needs to get repaid, and that money comes from homeowners.
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CDOs are empty buckets
Homeowners and mortgage lenders are easy to understand. But a big question mark swirls around Wall Street’s CDOs.
I like to think of the CDO as a football field full of empty buckets—one bucket per mortgage. As an investor, you don’t purchase one single bucket, or one mortgage. Instead, you purchase a thin horizontal slice across all the buckets—say, a half-inch slice right around the 1-gallon mark.
As the mortgages are repaid, it starts raining. The repayments—or rain—from Mortgage A doesn’t go solely into Bucket A, but rather is distributed across all the buckets, and all the buckets slowly get re-filled.
As long as your horizontal slice of the bucket is eventually surpassed, you get your money back plus interest. You don’t need every mortgage to be repaid. You just need enough mortgages to get to your slice.
It makes sense, then, that the tippy top of the bucket—which
gets filled up last—is the highest risk. If too many of the mortgages in the
CDO fail and aren’t repaid, then the tippy top of the bucket will never get
filled up, and those investors won’t get their money back.
These horizontal slices are called tranches, which might
sound familiar if you’ve read the book or watched the movie.
So far, there’s nothing too wrong about this practice. It’s simply moving the risk from the mortgage lender to other investors. Sure, the middle-men (banks, lenders, CDOs) are all taking a cut out of all the buy and sell transactions. But that’s no different than buying lettuce at grocery store prices vs. buying straight from the farmer. Middle-men take a cut. It happens.
But now, our final player enters the stage…
Credit Default Swaps: The
Lynchpin of the Big Short
Screw you, Wall Street nomenclature! A credit default swap sounds complicated, but it’s just insurance. Very simple, but they have a key role to explain the Big Short.
Investors thought, “Well, since I’m buying this risky tranche of a CDO, I might want to hedge my bets a bit and buy insurance in case it fails.” That’s what a credit default swap did. It’s insurance against something failing. But, there is a vital difference between a credit default swap and normal insurance.
I can’t buy an insurance policy on your house, on your car, or on your life. Only you can buy those policies. But, I could buy insurance on a CDO mortgage bond, even if I didn’t own that bond!
Not only that, but I could buy billions of dollars of insurance on a CDO that only contained millions of dollars of mortgages.
It’s like taking out a $1 million auto policy on a Honda Civic. No insurance company would allow you to do this, but it was happening all over Wall Street before 2008. This scenario essentially is “the big short” (see below)—making huge insurance bets that CDOs will fail—and many of the big banks were on the wrong side of this bet!
Credit default swaps involved the largest amounts of money in the subprime mortgage crisis. This is where the big Wall Street bets were taking place.
Quick definition: Short
A short is a bet that something will fail, get worse, or go down. When most people invest, they buy long (“I want this stock price to go up!”). A short is the opposite of that.
Certain individuals—like main characters Steve Eisman (aka Mark Baum in the movie, played by Steve Carrell) and Michael Burry (played by Christian Bale) in the 2015 Oscar-nominated film The Big Short—realized that tons of mortgages were being made to people who would never be able to pay them back.
If enough mortgages failed, then tranches of CDOs start to fail—no mortgage repayment means no rain, and no rain means the buckets stay empty. If CDOs fail, then the credit default swap insurance gets paid out. So what to do? Buy credit default swaps! That’s the quick and dirty way to explain the Big Short.
Why buy Dog Shit?
Wait a second. Why did people originally invest in these CDO bonds if they were full of “dog shit mortgages” (direct quote from the book) in the first place? Since The Big Short protagonists knew what was happening, shouldn’t the investors also have realized that the buckets would never get refilled?
For one, the prospectus—a fancy word for “owner’s manual”—of a CDO was very difficult to parse through. It was hard to understand exactly which mortgages were in the CDO. This is a skeevy big bank/CDO practice. And even if you knew which mortgages were in a CDO, it was nearly impossible to realize that many of those mortgages were made fraudulently.
The mortgage lenders were knowingly creating bad mortgages. They were giving loans to people with no hopes of repaying them. Why? Because the lenders knew they could immediately sell that mortgage—that risk—to a big bank, which would then securitize the mortgage into a CDO, and then sell that CDO to investors. Any risk that the lender took by creating a bad mortgage was quickly transferred to the investor.
So…because you can’t decipher the prospectus to tell which mortgages are in a CDO, it was easier to rely on the CDO’s rating than to evaluate each of the underlying mortgages. It’s the same reason why you don’t have to understand how engines work when you buy a car; you just look at Car & Driver or Consumer Reports for their opinions, their ratings.
The Ratings Agencies
Investors often relied on ratings to determine which bonds
to buy. The two most well-known ratings agencies from 2008 were Moody’s and
Standard & Poor’s (heard of the S&P
500?). The ratings agency’s job was to look at a CDO that a big bank created,
understand the underlying assets (in this case, the mortgages), and give the
CDO a rating to determine how safe it was. A good rating is “AAA”—so nice, it
got ‘A’ thrice.
So, were the ratings agencies doing their jobs? No! There are a few explanations for
this:
Even they—the experts in charge of grading the
bonds—didn’t understand what was going on inside a CDO. The owner’s manual
descriptions (prospectuses) were too complicated. In fact, ratings agencies
often relied on big banks to teach
seminars about how to rate CDOs, which is like a teacher learning how to
grade tests from Timmy, who still pees his pants. Timmy just wants an A.
Ratings agencies are profit-driven companies.
When they give a rating, they charge a fee. But if the agency hands out too
many bad grades, then their customers—the big banks—will take their requests
elsewhere in hopes of higher grades. The ratings agencies weren’t objective, but instead were biased by
their need for profits.
Remember those fraudulent mortgages that the
lenders were making? Unless you did some boots-on-the-ground research, it was
tough to uncover this fact. It’s hard to blame the ratings agencies for not
catching this.
Who’s to blame?
Everyone? Let’s play devil’s advocate…
Individuals: some people point the finger at homeowners, saying, “You should know better than to buy a $1 million house on a teacher’s salary.” I find this hard to swallow. These people, surrounded by the American home-ownership dream, were sold the idea that they would be fine. The mortgage lender had no incentive to sell a good mortgage, they only had an incentive to sell a mortgage. So, it’s hard for me to put too much blame on the homeowners.
Mortgage lenders: someone knew. I’m not saying that all the mortgage lenders were fully aware of the implications of their actions, but some people knew that fraudulent loans were being made, and chose to ignore that fact. For example, check out whistleblower Eileen Foster.
Big banks: Yes sir! There’s certainly blame here. Rather than get into all of the various money-grubbing, I want to call out one specific anecdote. Back in 2010, Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein testified in front of Congress. Here it is:
[embedded content]
To explain further, there are two things going on
here.
First, Goldman Sachs bankers were selling CDOs to investors. They wanted to make a commission on the sale.
At the same time, other bankers ALSO AT GOLDMAN SACHS were buying credit default swaps, a.k.a. betting against the same CDOs that the first Goldman Sachs bankers were selling.
This is like selling someone a racehorse with cancer, and then immediately going to the track to bet against that horse. Blankfein’s defense in this video is, “But the horse seller and the bettor weren’t the same people!” And the Congressmen responds, “But they worked for the same stable, and collected the same paychecks!”
So do the big banks deserve blame? You tell me.
Inspecting Goldman Sachs
One reason Goldman Sachs survived 2008 is that they began buying credit default swaps (insurance) just in time before the housing market crashed. They were still on the bad side of some bets, but mostly on the good side. They were net profitable.
Unfortunately for them, the banks that owed Goldman money were going bankrupt from their own debt, and then Goldman never would have been able to collect on their insurance. Goldman would’ve had to payout on their “bad” bets, while not collecting on their “good” bets. In their own words, they were “toast.”
This is significant. Even banks in “good” positions would’ve gone bankrupt, because the people who owed the most money weren’t able to repay all their debts. Imagine a chain; Bank A owes money to Bank B, and B owes money to Bank C. If Bank A fails, then B can’t collect their debt, and B can’t pay C. Bank C made “good” bets, but aren’t able to collect on them, and then they go out of business.
These failures would’ve rippled throughout the world. This explains why the US government felt it necessary to bail-out the banks. That federal money allowed banks in “good” positions to collect their profits and “stop the ripple” from tearing apart the world economy. While CDOs and credit default swap explain the Big Short starting, this ripple of failure is the mechanism that affected the entire world.
Betting more than you have
But if someone made a bad bet—sold bad insurance—why didn’t they have money to cover that bet? It all depends on risk. If you sell a $100 million insurance policy, and you think there’s a 1% chance of paying out that policy, what’s your exposure? It’s the potential loss multiplied by the probability = 1% times $100 million, or $1 million.
These banks sold billions of dollars of insurance under the assumption that there was a 5%, or 3%, or 1% chance of the housing market failing. So they had 20x, or 30x, or 100x less money on hand then they needed to cover these bets.
Turns out, there was a 100% chance that the market would fail…oops!
Blame, expounded
Ratings agencies—they should be unbiased. But they sold themselves off for profit. They invited the wolves—big banks—into their homes to teach them how to grade CDOs. Maybe they should read a blog to explain the Big Short to them. Of course they deserve blame. Here’s another anecdote of terrible judgment from the ratings agencies:
Think back to my analogy of the buckets and the rain. Sometimes, a ratings agency would look at a CDO and say, “You’re never going to fill up these buckets all the way. Those final tranches—the ones that won’t get filled—they’re really risky. So we’re going to give them a bad grade.” There were “Dog Shit” tranches, and Dog Shit gets a bad grade.
But then the CDO managers would go back to their offices and cut off the top of the buckets. And they’d do this for all their CDOs—cutting off all the bucket-top rings from all the different CDO buckets. And then they’d super-glue the bucket-top rings together to create a field full of Frankenstein buckets, officially called a CDO squared. Because the Frankenstein buckets were originally part of other CDOs, the Frankenstein buckets could only start filling up once the original buckets (which now had the tops cut off) were filled. In other words, the CDO managers decided to concentrate all their Dog Shit in one place, and super glue it together.
A reasonable person would look at the Frankenstein Dog Shit field of buckets and say, “That’s turrible, Kenny.”
BUT THE RATINGS AGENCIES GAVE CDO-SQUAREDs HIGH GRADES!!! Oh I’m sorry, was I yelling?!
“It’s diversified,” they would claim, as if Poodle shit mixed with Labrador shit is better than pure Poodle shit.
Again, you tell me. Do the ratings agencies deserve blame?!
Does the government deserve blame?
Yes and no.
For example, part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 mandated that the government mortgage finance firms (Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) purchase a certain number of sub-prime mortgages.
On its surface, this seems like a good thing: it’s giving money to potential home-buyers who wouldn’t otherwise qualify for a mortgage. It’s providing the American Dream.
But as we’ve already covered today, it does nobody any good to provide a bad mortgage to someone who can’t repay it. That’s what caused this whole calamity. Freddie and Fannie and HUD were pumping money into the machine, helping to enable it. Good intentions, but they weren’t paying attention to the unintended outcomes.
And what about the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC), the watchdogs of Wall Street. Do they have a role to explain the Big Short? Shouldn’t they have been aware of the Big Banks, the CDOs, the ratings agencies?
Yes, they deserve blame too. They’re supposed to do things like ensure that Big Banks have enough money on hand to cover their risky bets. This is called proper “risk management,” and it was severely lacking. The SEC also had the power to dig into the CDOs and ferret out the fraudulent mortgages that were creating them. Why didn’t they do that?
Perhaps the issue is that the SEC was/is simply too close to Wall Street, similar to the ratings agencies getting advice from the big banks. Watchdogs shouldn’t get treats from those they’re watching. Or maybe it’s that the CDOs and credit default swaps were too hard for the SEC to understand.
Either way, the SEC doesn’t have a good excuse. If you’re in bed with the people you’re regulating, then you’re doing a bad job. If you’re rubber stamping things you don’t understand, then you’re doing a bad job.
Explain the Big Short, shortly
You’re about 2500 words into my “short summary.” But the important things to remember:
Financial acronyms suck.
Money flowed from the investors down to the mortgage lenders, and the risk flowed from the mortgage lenders up to the investors. In between, the big banks and CDOs acted as middle men and intermediaries.
When someone feels like their actions have no risk, or no consequences, they’ll behave poorly (big banks, mortgage lenders) When someone is given what seems like an amazing deal, they’ll take it (individual home owners).
CDOs are like empty buckets. Mortgage payments are like rain, filling the buckets. Investors buy tranches, or slices, across all the buckets. If mortgages fail, then the buckets might not fill up, and the investors won’t get their money back.
CDOs are intentionally complex. So complex, that not even the people grading them understood what was going on (ratings agencies).
Buying insurance on something your do not own is a behavior with potential for abuse (big banks)
Buying insurance on something for more than it’s worth is a behavior with potential for abuse (big banks). This is where most of the money in the financial crisis switched hands.
And with that, I’d like to announce the opening of the Best Interest CDO. Rather than invest in mortgages, I’ll be investing in race horses. Don’t ask my why, but the current top stallion is named ‘Dog Shit.’ He’ll take Wall Street by storm.
Thank you for reading! If you enjoyed this article, join 6000+ subscribers who read my 2-minute weekly email, where I send you links to the smartest financial content I find online every week.
-Jesse
Want to learn more about The Best Interest’s back story? Read here.
If you prefer to listen, check out The Best Interest Podcast.
Potential homebuyers who are not employed full-time or whose income is considered irregular may not have the proof of employment typically associated with a mortgage. However, these consumers do not have to abandon their dreams of becoming homeowners altogether.
Instead, they could qualify for a no-documentation mortgage, also known as a no-doc mortgage, no-income verification mortgage, or no income, no job or assets’ (NINJA) mortgage.
As the name suggests, there is less paperwork involved to get approved for a no-doc mortgage. The lenders will go through non-traditional channels to verify a borrower’s income.
In this article, you’ll learn about what no-doc mortgages are and their requirements, who can qualify, and whether or not this may be the best option for you.
What Is a No-Doc Mortgage and How Does It Work?
No-doc mortgages don’t require the normal sort of documentation of most loans such as bank statements or recent pay stubs. This type of mortgage loan is generally intended for people who don’t have tax forms from an employer or who want their information to remain confidential.
Depending on the situation, you will still need to provide some evidence of income.
Since no-doc loans are risky for lenders, your interest rate will be much higher than usual and you may have to look around at multiple companies before someone will take a gamble on you. You’re unlikely to find no-doc loans at the big banks.
To have a realistic chance of being approved, you will need to have an excellent credit score.
If your credit score isn’t 740 or higher, you will need to make every possible effort to increase it before applying for this type of loan.
What Is a No Ratio Loan?
No ratio loan is another variety of no-doc loans. It’s primarily for people who don’t want to disclose their income or have complicated and fluctuating sources of income.
While most borrowers must have a debt-to-income ratio below 43% to qualify for a loan, a no ratio loan means that lenders won’t take your DTI into account.
To qualify for a no ratio loan, you will also need a solid credit score, and it’s ideal to have significant assets as well. With this type of loan carrying considerable risks for lenders, you can expect to pay a higher interest rate than one where you prove your income.
Are No-Doc Mortgages Still Available?
While it is deemed a niche product in the housing industry that has historically been associated with sub-prime lenders, no-doc mortgages still exist and continue to evolve today.
Since the housing crisis of 2007/2008, in which mainstream lenders had exposure to sub-prime mortgages, lending standards on no-doc mortgages have tightened to provide better consumer protections.
Before, these loans were the go-to, self-employed mortgage based on a trust system between lenders and borrowers on income. These days, it is not that simple.
This primarily affects the NINJA mortgage: lenders were not required to verify a borrower’s income, assets, or job status. These loans have mostly gone away since the Great Financial Crisis.
Who Can Get a No-Doc Mortgage Loan?
A no-doc mortgage loan is designed for people outside the realm of the traditional financial system. No-doc mortgages are meant for high-net-worth individuals whose employment income is not cut and dry.
For example, an entrepreneur with equity in a startup with enough operating history could be an ideal candidate for a no-documentation mortgage. Under these conditions, even a high-middle-class borrower might not meet the standard.
Circumstances under which you might be able to qualify for a no-documentation mortgage include:
If your paychecks are sporadic, but you have managed to accumulate savings or liquid assets that can easily be converted to cash.
Self-employed people or those who work in the gig economy or restaurant business.
Another candidate for no-doc mortgages is someone who receives steady deposits that their bank statements can verify. In this case, they could qualify for a self-employed mortgage loan, a term used interchangeably with a no-doc mortgage.
Real estate investors make up another potential borrower category for a no-documentation mortgage. For buyers who are flush with cash and whose steady rental income will pay the mortgage, no-doc mortgage loans could be the ideal solution.
Advantages of a No-Doc Mortgage Loan
The key benefit of a no-doc mortgage loan is that it plays the same function as traditional loans. At the end of the day, it helps the consumer to own a home. In addition, borrowers can avoid excessive paperwork generally required for an application, and they could even have the closing process accelerated compared to a fully documented loan.
When you are ready to take advantage of these benefits, find a Total Mortgage loan expert near you to find out if you qualify for a no-doc mortgage.
Requirements for a No-Doc Mortgage Loan
You may be wondering what it takes to qualify for a no-doc mortgage. The truth is that what no-doc mortgage loans lack in the paperwork, they make up for in other requirements.
For example, to be eligible for a self-employed mortgage, a borrower is expected to maintain a higher credit score than required for a fully-documented mortgage. In addition, they will need to put down a higher down payment as a percentage of the purchase price.
Minimum down payment: Homebuyers can expect to pay a down payment of anywhere between 20 to 30% or more of the purchase price.
Minimal credit score: No doc mortgage loans have a stringent credit score requirement of at least 700, which according to Experian, falls into the “good” category of credit score rankings.
Explore Total Mortgage’s Loan Options
No-doc mortgages are geared toward people who don’t have a steady income or full-time employment but want to become homeowners. Since the risk to the lender is greater with no-doc mortgages, qualifying for one is quite difficult but not impossible.
If your credit history and financial situation tick all the boxes listed in this article, homeownership may be within reach for you with a no-doc mortgage. If not, you might want to explore your options with a traditional mortgage. We are here to walk you through the process from beginning to end.
Take the first step by applying for a mortgage today, or find a Total Mortgage branch near you and discuss your options in person with one of our loan advisors.
When it comes time to reach a major financial milestone like buying a home, the negative information on your credit report could interfere with your dreams. Fortunately, there are steps you can take to improve a poor credit score and work towards homeownership.Â
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