The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) will revise the treatment of active single-family mortgages backed by government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for which borrowers elected a COVID-19 forbearance under the Enterprises’ representations and warranties framework, according to its newest media release.

“Under the updated rep and warrant policies, loans for which borrowers elected a COVID-19 forbearance will be treated similarly to loans for which borrowers obtained forbearance due to a natural disaster,” the FHFA said. “As a result, loans with a COVID-19 forbearance will remain eligible for certain rep and warrant relief based on the borrower’s payment history over the first 36 months following origination.”

FHFA Director Sandra L. Thompson argued that homeowners, who needed more time to keep up with housing costs during the pandemic, benefited from a mortgage forbearance plan that would reduce or suspend mortgage payments.

“Forbearance was an invaluable tool for borrowers experiencing financial hardship due to the COVID-19 pandemic,” Thompson said. “Servicers went to great lengths to implement forbearance quickly amid a national emergency, and the loans they service should not be subject to greater repurchase risk simply because a borrower was impacted by the pandemic.”

The Enterprises’ existing rep and warrant policies with respect to natural disasters allow the time the borrower is in forbearance to be included when demonstrating a satisfactory payment history in the first 36 months following origination, the FHFA noted. These policies will now expand to loans for which borrowers elected a COVID-19 forbearance.

Thompson stressed the importance of helping current and prospective homeowners manage present housing conditions at the Mortgage Bankers Association Annual Convention last week.  “In a housing market like this one, it is all the more important that both our policies and the industry’s efforts align to support existing and aspiring homeowners,” Thompson said. “That is why I believe a model based on partnership and mutual feedback is necessary for us to achieve our shared goal of promoting affordable and sustainable housing opportunities.”

If you’re considering becoming a homeowner, it could help to shop around to find the best mortgage rate. Visit Credible to compare options from different lenders and choose the one with the best rate for you.

MORTGAGE RATES KEEP CLIMBING, BUT BUYERS CAN FIND THE BEST DEALS BY DOING THESE TWO THINGS: FREDDIE MAC 

Mortgage rates affecting affordability, buyers advised to build up down payments

Mortgage rates are continuing their ascent. The average 30-year fixed-rate mortgage rose to 7.63% for the week ending Oct. 19, according to the Freddie Mac’s latest Primary Mortgage Market Survey. This time in 2022, the 30-year fixed-rate was below 7%. 

Buyers may do well for themselves by browsing for the best home loans and making a considerable down payment. Freddie Mac’s Chief Economist Sam Khater said “in this environment, it’s important that borrowers shop around with multiple lenders for the best mortgage rate.”

Freddie Mac announced last week the launch of DPA One®, a new tool that strives to help mortgage lenders quickly find and match borrowers to down payment assistance programs nationwide. 

“DPA One delivers a one-stop shop at no cost that brings lenders and their borrowers greater detail and visibility into these programs, while seamlessly connecting the right assistance program with the lender, housing counselors and borrowers who need this assistance the most,” Sonu Mittal, Freddie Mac’s senior vice president of and head of single-family acquisitions, explained.

“With research showing down payment is the single largest barrier to first-time homebuyers attaining homeownership, borrowers should also ask their lender about down payment assistance,” Khater said.

If you’re looking to buy a home, you could still find the best mortgage rates by shopping around. Visit Credible to compare your options without affecting your credit score.

MANY AMERICANS PREPARING FOR A RECESSION DESPITE SIGNS THAT SAY OTHERWISE: SURVEY

Housing market showing lackluster activity

By end of 2023, there is likely to have been around 4.1 million existing home sales in the U.S., which would mark the weakest year of home sales since the Great Recession of 2008, according to a Redfin report. 

Redfin’s Economic Research Lead Chen Zhao said current conditions have led to buyer and seller hesitancy across the board. 

“Buyers have been in a bind all year,” Zhao said. “High mortgage rates and still-high prices are making it harder than ever to afford a home, shutting many young people out of homeownership and causing homeowners to reevaluate whether 2023 is the right time to move. Mortgage rates are staying high longer than anticipated, keeping away everyone except those who need to move and pushing our sales projection for the year down to a 15-year low.

“The last time home sales were this low was during the Great Recession,” Zhao continued.

Redfin agents suggest that buyers invest in newly built properties which are performing more strongly than existing-home sales. Newly constructed homes saw sales increase 1.5% year-over-year in September as prices dropped about 4%, according to Redfin’s data. 

Based on the findings from a National Association of Realtors (NAR) report, the total amount of home sales decreased by 2% from August to September and have dropped 15.4% since September 2022.

Looking to reduce your home buying costs? It may benefit you to compare your options to find the best mortgage rate. Visit Credible to speak with a home loan expert and get your questions answered.

AFFORDABILITY KEEPING YOU FROM OWNING A HOME? HERE’S HOW YOU CAN GET READY

Have a finance-related question, but don’t know who to ask? Email The Credible Money Expert at [email protected] and your question might be answered by Credible in our Money Expert column.

Source: foxbusiness.com

Apache is functioning normally

Apache is functioning normally

Verifications provider Argyle announced its integration with Fannie Mae’s Desktop Underwriter (DU) program on Monday, becoming the first DU-authorized report supplier to offer automated income and employment verification reports based on consumer-permissioned, direct-source data.

The integration enables mortgage lenders to use Argyle’s income and employment verification solution to get Day 1 Certainty and relief from representations and warranties on validated data.

The real-time nature of the verifications could help lenders limit loan repurchases, said John Hardesty, general manager of mortgage at Argyle. “As soon as a borrower puts in their credentials, we have live data. From a buyback perspective, the lender can have confidence in the data from the second they run the report.”

Argyle’s coverage includes 85% of the U.S. workforce, and the company says it offers up to 80% lower verification costs than other data providers.

“At Fannie Mae, we continue to focus on improving the digital mortgage experience,” said Peter Skarnulis, Fannie Mae’s vice president of single-family digital management solutions. “This is another opportunity for lenders to automate income and employment data verification, which can make the mortgage process more efficient for both lenders and borrowers.”

Income and employment verification are critical parts of the mortgage loan process, especially as fraud continues to plague the industry. Argyle’s ability to go to the source of income and employment documents from payroll providers and employer sources gives lenders a huge boost in the fight against fraud, Hardesty said.

“From a fraud perspective, it’s easy to make a fake pay stub or other documents online — it’s one Google click away — so relying on consumers to provide this information is risky,” Hardesty said. “We’re pulling data from the source, and we can give lenders another view into income and employment that they’ve never had before.”

Argyle’s integration with Fannie Mae’s DU will be complete and available by the end of this month.

Source: housingwire.com

Apache is functioning normally

Apache is functioning normally

DBRS, Inc. (DBRS Morningstar) finalized its provisional credit ratings on the following Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2023-SRM1 (the Notes) issued by Brean Asset Backed Securities Trust 2023-SRM1:

— $109.3 million Class A at AAA (sf)
— $11.5 million Class M1 at AA (sf)
— $11.5 million Class M2 at A (sf)
— $15.7 million Class M3 at BBB (sf)
— $15.8 million Class M4 at BB (sf)
— $15.7 million Class M5 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) credit rating reflects credit enhancement of 46.3% for Class A, AA (sf) credit rating reflects credit enhancement of 40.7% for Class M1, A (sf) credit rating reflects credit enhancement of 35.1% for Class M2, BBB (sf) credit rating reflects credit enhancement of 27.3% for Class M3, BB (sf) credit rating reflects credit enhancement of 19.6% for Class M4, and B (sf) credit rating reflects credit enhancement of 11.9% for Class M5.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not rate any other classes in this transaction.

Lenders typically offer reverse mortgage loans to people who are at least 62 years old. Through reverse mortgage loans, borrowers have access to home equity through a lump sum amount or a stream of payments without periodically repaying principal or interest, allowing the loan balance to accumulate over a period of time until a maturity event occurs. Loan repayment is required (1) if the borrower dies, (2) if the borrower sells the related residence, (3) if the borrower no longer occupies the related residence for a period (usually a year), (4) if it is no longer the borrower’s primary residence, (5) if a tax or insurance default occurs, or (6) if the borrower fails to properly maintain the related residence. In addition, borrowers must be current on any homeowner’s association dues, if applicable. Reverse mortgages are typically nonrecourse; borrowers don’t have to provide additional assets in cases where the outstanding loan amount exceeds the property’s value (the crossover point). As a result, liquidation proceeds will fall below the loan amount in cases where the outstanding balance reaches the crossover point, contributing to higher loss severities for these loans.

As of the August 31, 2023, cut-off date, the collateral has approximately $203.70 million in current unpaid principal balance (UPB) from 189 active and 46 inactive reverse mortgage loans secured by first liens on single-family residential properties, condominiums, multifamily (two- to four-family) properties, and co-operatives. The loans were all originated in 2006 and 2007 and were originally securitized in the SASCO 2007-RM1 transaction. All loans in this pool are floating-rate assets with an 8.79% weighted-average coupon.

As of the cut-off date, the loans in this transaction are both performing and nonperforming (i.e., active and inactive). There are 189 performing loans, representing 79.85% of the total UPB. As for the 46 nonperforming loans, 19 loans are referred for foreclosure or in foreclosure (9.62% of the balance), eight are in default (2.50%), seven are liquidated/held for sale (3.21%), and 12 are called due following recent maturity (4.82%). None of the loans are insured by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); therefore, inactive loans (including the currently inactive loans) do not benefit from the typical insurance claim that HUD-insured loans experience.

The transaction uses a structure in which cash distributions are made sequentially to each rated note until the rated amounts with respect to such notes are paid off. No subordinate note shall receive any payments until the balance of senior notes has been reduced to zero.

DBRS Morningstar’s credit ratings on the Notes address the credit risk associated with the identified financial obligations in accordance with the relevant transaction documents. The associated financial obligations for each of the rated Notes are the related Note Amount and Interest Accrual Amounts.

DBRS Morningstar’s long-term credit ratings provide opinions on risk of default. DBRS Morningstar considers risk of default to be the risk that an issuer will fail to satisfy the financial obligations in accordance with the terms under which a long-term obligation has been issued.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS
There were no Environmental/Social/Governance factors that had a significant or relevant effect on the credit analysis.

A description of how DBRS Morningstar considers ESG factors within the DBRS Morningstar analytical framework can be found in the DBRS Morningstar Criteria: Approach to Environmental, Social, and Governance Risk Factors in Credit Ratings at https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/416784 (July 4, 2023).

Notes:
All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.

The principal methodology applicable to the credit ratings is Rating and Monitoring U.S. Reverse Mortgage Securitizations (July 17, 2023; https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/417277).

Other methodologies referenced in this transaction are listed at the end of this press release.

The DBRS Morningstar Sovereign group releases baseline macroeconomic scenarios for rated sovereigns. DBRS Morningstar analysis considered impacts consistent with the baseline scenarios as set forth in the following report: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/384482.

The credit rating was initiated at the request of the rated entity.

The rated entity or its related entities did participate in the credit rating process for this credit rating action.

DBRS Morningstar had access to the accounts, management, and other relevant internal documents of the rated entity or its related entities in connection with this credit rating action.

This is a solicited credit rating.

The full report providing additional analytical detail is available by clicking on the link under Related Documents below or by contacting us at [email protected].

DBRS, Inc.
140 Broadway, 43rd Floor
New York, NY 10005 USA
Tel. +1 212 806-3277

The credit rating methodologies used in the analysis of this transaction can be found at: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/about/methodologies.

— Interest Rate Stresses for U.S. Structured Finance Transactions (June 9, 2023),
https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/415687

— Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance (December 7, 2022),
https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/407008

— Operational Risk Assessment for U.S. RMBS Originators (August 31, 2023),
https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/420106

— Operational Risk Assessment for U.S. RMBS Servicers (August 31, 2023),
https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/420107

— Representations and Warranties Criteria for U.S. RMBS Transactions (May 16, 2023),
https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/414076

For more information on this credit or on this industry, visit www.dbrsmorningstar.com or contact us at [email protected].

Source: dbrsmorningstar.com

Apache is functioning normally

DBRS, Inc. (DBRS Morningstar) finalized its following provisional ratings on the Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2023-DSC2 (the Certificates) to be issued by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2023-DSC2 (JPMMT 2023-DSC2):

— $201.2 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
— $201.2 million Class A-1-A at AAA (sf)
— $201.2 million Class A-1-A-X at AAA (sf)
— $201.2 million Class A-1-B at AAA (sf)
— $201.2 million Class A-1-B-X at AAA (sf)
— $201.2 million Class A-1-C at AAA (sf)
— $201.2 million Class A-1-C-X at AAA (sf)
— $32.0 million Class A-2 at AA (high) (sf)
— $32.0 million Class A-2-A at AA (high) (sf)
— $32.0 million Class A-2-A-X at AA (high) (sf)
— $32.0 million Class A-2-B at AA (high) (sf)
— $32.0 million Class A-2-B-X at AA (high) (sf)
— $32.0 million Class A-2-C at AA (high) (sf)
— $32.0 million Class A-2-C-X at AA (high) (sf)
— $34.5 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
— $34.5 million Class A-3-A at A (sf)
— $34.5 million Class A-3-A-X at A (sf)
— $34.5 million Class A-3-B at A (sf)
— $34.5 million Class A-3-B-X at A (sf)
— $34.5 million Class A-3-C at A (sf)
— $34.5 million Class A-3-C-X at A (sf)
— $14.8 million Class M-1 at BBB (low) (sf)
— $10.8 million Class B-1 at BB (low) (sf)
— $7.9 million Class B-2 at B (low) (sf)

Classes A-1-A-X, A-1-B-X, A-1-C-X, A-2-A-X, A-2-B-X, A-2-C-X, A-3-A-X, A-3-B-X, and A-3-C-X are interest-only(IO) exchangeable certificates. The class balances represent notional amounts.

Classes A-1-A, A-1-B, A-1-C, A-2-A, A-2-B, A-2-C, A-3-A, A-3-B, and A-3-C are also exchangeable certificates.

The exchangeable classes can be exchanged for combinations of depositable certificates as specified in the offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect 34.70% of credit enhancement provided by subordinated certificates. The AA (high) (sf), A (sf), BBB (low) (sf), BB (low) (sf), and B (low) (sf) ratings reflect 24.30%, 13.10%, 8.30%, 4.80%, and 2.25% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not rate any other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and adjustable-rate, investor debt service coverage ratio (DSCR; 92.0%) and conventional (8%), first-lien residential mortgages funded by the issuance of the Certificates. The Certificates are backed by 950 mortgage loans (representing 1,546 properties) with a total principal balance of $308,148,236 as of the Cut-Off Date (August 1, 2023).

JPMMT 2023-DSC2 represents the third securitization issued from the JPMMT-DSC shelf (the first of such rated by DBRS Morningstar), which is generally backed by business-purpose investment property loans primarily underwritten using DSCR. J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. (JPMMAC) serves as the Sponsor of this transaction.

The mortgage loans were underwritten to program guidelines for business-purpose loans that are designed to rely on property value, the mortgagor’s credit profile, and predominantly the DSCR, where applicable. Since the loans were made to investors for business purposes, they are exempt from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules and the TILA/RESPA Integrated Disclosure rule.

JPMMAC, acquired (or in advance of closing, will have acquired) the loans directly from originators, or in other cases certain third-party initial aggregators (B4 Residential Mortgage Trust, Series I, B4 Residential Mortgage Trust, Series IV, (together, B4), MAXEX Clearing LLC (MAXEX) ,and Oceanview Dispositions, LLC (Oceanview) that directly or indirectly acquired other mortgage loans. On the closing date, JPMMAC will sell all of its interest in the mortgage loans to the depositor. Various originators, each generally comprising less than 15% of the pool (except LendingOne LLC with 17.7%), originated the loans. As further detailed in this report, DBRS Morningstar did not perform individual originator reviews for the purpose of evaluating the mortgage pool.

The Sponsor, or a majority-owned affiliate, will retain an eligible vertical interest representing at least 5% of the aggregate fair value of the Certificates, other than the Class A-R Certificates, to satisfy the credit risk-retention requirements under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Such retention aligns Sponsor and investor interest in the capital structure.

On any date following the date on which the aggregate unpaid principal balance (UPB) of the mortgage loans is less than or equal to 10% of the Cut-Off Date balance, the Optional Clean-Up Call Holder will have the option to terminate the transaction by directing the Master Servicer to purchase all of the mortgage loans and any real estate owned (REO) property from the Issuer at a price equal to the sum of the aggregate UPB of the mortgage loans (other than any REO property) plus accrued interest thereon, the lesser of the fair market value of any REO property and the stated principal balance of the related loan, and any outstanding and unreimbursed servicing advances, accrued and unpaid fees, any non-interest-bearing deferred amounts, and expenses that are payable or reimbursable to the transaction parties.

Of note, the representations and warranty (R&W) framework of this transaction, while still containing certain weaknesses, does utilize certain features more closely aligned with post-crisis prime transactions, such as automatic reviews at 120-day delinquency and the use of an independent third party R&W reviewer. For this, and other reasons as further detailed in Representations and Warranties section of the rating report, this framework is perceived as stronger than that of a typical Non-QM/DSCR transaction..

NewRez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing will act as the Servicer for all of the loans following the servicing transfer date. Shellpoint currently services 44.9% of the pool. Prior to the servicing transfer date, Fay and Selene service 44.6% and 10.5% of the pool, respectively, as Interim Servicers. Computershare Trust Company, N.A. (rated BBB with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as the Paying Agent, Certificate Registrar, and Custodian.

For this transaction, the Servicer will fund advances of delinquent principal and interest (P&I) until loans become 120 days delinquent or are otherwise deemed unrecoverable. Additionally, the Servicer is obligated to make advances in respect of taxes, insurance premiums, and reasonable costs incurred in the course of servicing and disposing of properties (servicing advances). If the Servicer fails in its obligation to advance, the Master Servicer is obligated to make such advance to the extent it deems the advance recoverable. If the Master Servicer fails in its obligation to advance, the Securities Administrator is obligated to make such advance to the extent it deems the advance recoverable.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure with a pro rata principal distribution among the senior classes (Classes A-1, A-2, and A-3) subject to certain performance triggers related to cumulative losses or delinquencies exceeding a specified threshold (Trigger Event). Prior to a Trigger Event, principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on Classes A-1, A-2, and A-3 before being applied to amortize the balances of the Certificates. After a Trigger Event, principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on Classes A-1 and A-2 sequentially (IIPP). For the more subordinate Certificates, principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls as the more senior Certificates are paid in full.

Excess spread, if available, can be used to cover (1) realized losses and (2) cumulative applied realized loss amounts preceding the allocation of funds to unpaid Cap Carryover Amounts due to Classes A-1 down to A-3. Interest and principal otherwise payable to Class B-3 interest and principal may be used to pay the Cap Carryover Amounts.

The rating reflects transactional strengths that include the following:
— Improved underwriting standards;
— Certain loan attributes;
— Robust pool composition;
— Satisfactory third-party due-diligence review; and
— 100% of the loans are current by MBA definition.

The transaction also includes the following challenges:
— 100% investor loans;
— Four-month servicer advances of delinquent P&I; and
— Representations and warranties framework.

The full description of the strengths, challenges, and mitigating factors are detailed in the related report.

DBRS Morningstar’s credit ratings on the Certificates address the credit risk associated with the identified financial obligations in accordance with the relevant transaction documents. The associated financial obligations for the rated Certificates are the Interest Distribution Amount, Interest Carryforward Amount, and the Class Principal Amount.

DBRS Morningstar’s credit ratings do not address nonpayment risk associated with contractual payment obligations contemplated in the applicable transaction documents that are not financial obligations. For example, in this transaction, DBRS Morningstar’s ratings do not address the payment of any Cap Carryover Amount based on its position in the cash flow waterfall.

DBRS Morningstar’s long-term credit ratings provide opinions on risk of default. DBRS Morningstar considers risk of default to be the risk that an issuer will fail to satisfy the financial obligations in accordance with the terms under which a long-term obligation has been issued.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS
There were no Environmental/Social/Governance factors that had a significant or relevant effect on the credit analysis.

A description of how DBRS Morningstar considers ESG factors within the DBRS Morningstar analytical framework can be found in the DBRS Morningstar Criteria: Approach to Environmental, Social, and Governance Risk Factors in Credit Ratings at https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/416784 (July 4, 2023)

Notes:
All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.

The principal methodology applicable to the credit ratings is RMBS Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and Rating Methodology (August 9, 2023; https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/418987).

Other methodologies referenced in this transaction are listed at the end of this press release.

The DBRS Morningstar Sovereign group releases baseline macroeconomic scenarios for rated sovereigns. DBRS Morningstar analysis considered impacts consistent with the baseline scenarios as set forth in the following report: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/384482.

The credit rating was initiated at the request of the rated entity.

The rated entity or its related entities did participate in the credit rating process for this credit rating action.

DBRS Morningstar had access to the accounts, management, and other relevant internal documents of the rated entity or its related entities in connection with this credit rating action.

This is a solicited credit rating.

Please see the related appendix for additional information regarding the sensitivity of assumptions used in the credit rating process.

DBRS, Inc.
140 Broadway, 43rd Floor
New York, NY 10005 USA
Tel. +1 212 806-3277

The credit rating methodologies used in the analysis of this transaction can be found at: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/about/methodologies.

— Assessing U.S. RMBS Pools Under the Ability-to-Repay Rules (April 28, 2023; https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/413297)

— Interest Rate Stresses for U.S. Structured Finance Transactions (June 9, 2023; https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/415687)

— Third-Party Due-Diligence Criteria for U.S. RMBS Transactions (September 11, 2020; https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/366613)

— Representations and Warranties Criteria for U.S. RMBS Transactions (May 16, 2023; https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/414076)

— Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance (December 7, 2022; https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/407008)

— Operational Risk Assessment for U.S. RMBS Originators (July 17, 2023; https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/417275)

— Operational Risk Assessment for U.S. RMBS Servicers (July 17, 2023; https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/417276)

For more information on this credit or on this industry, visit www.dbrsmorningstar.com or contact us at [email protected].

Source: dbrsmorningstar.com

Apache is functioning normally

The largest institutional single-family rental (SFR) operator in the country, Invitation Homes, is in the hot seat over its alleged failure to comply with building-permit requirements for rental properties it owns in California.

Another larger player in the space, Progress Residential, recently postponed a securitization transaction due to difficult market conditions. And yet another big force in the market, FirstKey Homes, is pulling collateral out of a 2021 securitization deal.

These developments—and more—can be seen as cracks in the armor of a housing-industry sector that rose out of the ashes of the Great Recession and grew to become a thriving alternative for individuals locked out the home-purchase market by rapidly rising prices.

The market stresses facing the SFR sector now include decelerating rents, a rising cost of capital and a shortage of homes available to purchase — which has slowed property acquisitions and related securitization deals that help market players regenerate capital.

David Petrosinelli, a New York-based senior trader with InspereX, a tech-driven underwriter and distributor of securities that operates multiple trading desks around the country, said he expects the securitization market for institutional SFR players to “approximate a more normal market by summertime.”

“But the caveat, of course, is that all bets are off if there’s a more meaningful contraction in lending [in the wake of recent bank failures and other economic factors] because then you’re in serious trouble,” Petrosinelli added.

Inviting an SFR lawsuit

Invitation Homes earlier this year failed to convince a judge to dismiss a pending whistleblower lawsuit filed against the company in federal court in San Diego that alleges it made improvements at scores of properties in California without first securing required building permits. 

The lawsuit claims further that the company “ignored permitting laws to avoid fees and increased taxes as well as to get renovated homes on the rental market as soon as possible.” The whistleblower litigation, known as a qui tam action — which allows private parties to sue on behalf of the United States — was filed under seal in state court in California in 2020 and moved last year to federal court — where the judge’s ruling denying dismissal of the case was handed down in January of this year.

The lawsuit is filed as a false-claims action on behalf of some 18 California cities by an entity called Blackbird Special Projects LLC, which discovered the alleged violations based on its examination of public records using artificial intelligence software. If successful in the litigation, Blackbird stands to get a cut of any recoveries for the local governments.

“To support these assertions, [Blackbird] used proprietary software to scour different rental listing websites such as Zillow.com and [Invitation Home’s] website to identify homes owned by defendant,” pleadings in federal court state. “[Blackbird] then used its proprietary ‘lookback’ technology to access pre-renovation images of the homes from a multiple listing service and compare them with post-renovation images from the rental advertisements.”

Invitation Homes declined to comment on specific allegations raised in the lawsuit, but a company spokesman did say the “allegations are without merit, and we intend to vigorously defend the company.”

“Invitation Homes is currently the largest owner of single-family, rental homes in the United States, with most of its homes located in California, Florida, Georgia, Texas and other Sun Belt states,” the federal lawsuit states. “In California, as of December 31, 2019, defendant [Invitation Homes] owned 12,461 single-family homes in over 100 cities. 

“… By its failure to pay or remit inspection, permit fees, penalties and interest, Invitation Homes has defrauded cities and counties in California millions of dollars.”

By “renovating thousands of homes” absent obtaining building permits, pleadings in the case allege, Invitation Homes was able to “avoid revaluations that would have happened if permits were obtained, thus evading increased property taxes on improved properties.”

The Invitation Homes’ case is being watched closely by some players in the secondary market, where large SFR operators like Invitation Homes raise funds through securitization deals backed by their rental properties.

“The reason this matters is they [Invitation Homes] make representations and warranties into their securitization trusts that all work improvements are permitted,” explained Ben Hunsaker, a portfolio manager focused on securitized credit for California-based Beach Point Capital Management. “So, there are points where they may have to refinance securitization debt if this [litigation] goes sideways for them with unsecured corporate debt, and they go from 1% or 2% cost of capital to 7% or 8% cost of capital, and they also have to worry about their ratings then.”

Invitation Homes (IH) spent about $25,000 on renovations per home for its California SFR portfolio, pleadings in the lawsuit state. 

“The vast majority of IH’s renovations required permits — including for demolishing and constructing sections of single-family homes, installing and demolishing pools, and significantly altering the electrical work— but permits were not obtained,” court pleadings allege. “Once the single-family homes were renovated without the required permits, IH rented them to tenants who were unaware of the unpermitted and potentially unsafe renovations.”

The federal judge now overseeing the case earlier this year denied a motion lodged by Invitation Homes seeking to have the case dismissed. As part of that ruling, the judge made clear that he wasn’t going to entertain any arguments by the defendant seeking to shift blame to contractors for failing to secure the building permits.

The judge states in his ruling, essentially, that even if independent contractors are responsible for the alleged failure to obtain building permits, that fact alone doesn’t absolve Invitation Homes of the responsibility to “do the investigating itself” to ensure permits were issued.

Industrywide turbulence

The lawsuit against Invitation Homes is not the only dark cloud hanging over the institutional SFR sector.

The securitization market for institutional SFR companies, which collectively represent some 5% of an SFR market composed of some 17 million properties, is currently in the doldrums. That’s largely due to a lack of housing available to purchase, and consequently a lack of new assets to securitize, according to market expert L.D. Salmanson.

Salmanson is CEO of Cherre, a data-integration and insights platform that works with major players in the real estate market, including insurers, asset managers, lenders and SFR operators. The company serves as a data warehouse and deep analytics platform that integrates client data with other public and private data sources to create powerful market assessment and forecasting tools.

“First of all, there’s been a massive slowdown in the purchase rate for the large [SFR] players,” Salmanson said. “What’s been causing the slowdown is not the [flat to decelerating] rental prices, although that is affecting it.

“Rather, it’s that there are a lot less people selling because they’re not getting the [higher] prices that they’re looking for [as home prices decelerate]. But that’s temporary. That’s not going to last.”

Last year, there were a total of 15 securitization deals involving large institutional SFR players valued in total at $10.3 billion, according to data tracked by Kroll Bond Rating Agency (KBRA). This year, so far, there has been one offering, a $343 million securitization deal by Progress Residential (Progress 2023-SFR1) that closed in late February, KBRA data show.

Yet even Progress, which has a portfolio of some 83,000 SFR properties, appears to be caught up in the SFR securitization stagnation. Hunsaker said one major SFR player a few weeks ago postponed a securitization deal, pulling it off the market prior to pricing due to market conditions. 

That player, according to industry sources, was Pretium Partners-backed Progress Residential, and the deal was Progress 2023-SFR2.

Hunsaker added that another potential drag on the institutional SFR market is the fact that some single-family rental (SFR) operators are backed by investment firms that also invest in the commercial real estate market, which he said also is facing stiff headwinds now — particularly in the office and multifamily sectors. 

For example, Bridge Investment Group Holdings early last year acquired Gorelick Brothers Capital’s estimated 2,700 SFR-property portfolio spread across 14 markets concentrated in the Sunbelt and Midwest. Bridge’s portfolio also includes investments in office and multifamily properties. 

Likewise, SFR operator FirstKey Homes, with a portfolio of some 45,000 SFR properties under management, is an affiliate of Cerberus Capital Management, a global investment firm with approximately $60 billion in assets across credit, private equity as well as residential and commercial real estate interests. 

KBRA reported last month that FirstKey Homes exercised a so-called “excess collateral release” [ECR] feature for a securitization deal dubbed FirstKey Homes 2021-SFR1. It was the first such ECR exercised across the 12 KBRA-rated securitization deals to date that have included such a provision.

“In connection with the subject transaction … the issuer requested release [via the ECR] of 729 properties from the collateral pool of 9,218 properties,” KBRA’s report notes. “Post release, the remaining 8,489 properties will collateralize the same debt of $2.06 billion [due to increased home values]. 

“…The analysis indicated that the [exercise of the] ECR, in and of itself, would not result in a downgrade.”

Hunsaker said for many SFR operators facing uncertainty now, the solution is to stop buying new properties if they believe their cost of capital is rising too much — absent home prices dropping enough in the future to make the numbers work. 

“I think most of these [SFR operators] are capitalized for longer-term [property] holding incentives [and] … I don’t think these structures are set up to be forced sellers,” Hunsaker said.

He added that healthy home-price appreciation to date made it possible for FirstKey Homes to release the excess collateral from the 2021 securitization deal.

“But they weren’t releasing that excess collateral to sell the houses,” he stressed. “They’re releasing that excess collateral to put it on their balance sheet and reduce the amount of encumbered debt they have.”

FirstKey Homes does not share financial details about its operations for competitive reasons, a company spokesman said when asked to comment on the ECR transaction. 

“What’s vital to remember is that across the SFR sector, investors are still active, albeit a bit more selective, with the belief SFR provides durable cash flows and stable occupancies,” the FirstKey spokesman added. “Additionally, with household formations significantly outpacing the decades-long low housing supply, it bodes well for continued strong demand for the high-quality single-family rental homes we provide our family of residents.”

Source: housingwire.com

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